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Context
Facts Law
 Planned obsolescence (cars, 
smartphones, etc.)
 Most (un)favored consumers 
(insurance, etc.)
 IP tracking history of web users: 
previous visits on website, search 
through price comparator, etc. 
(train or plane tickets)
 Versioning and artificial disabling of 
available functionality (low end and 
high end fragmentation)
 Shrouding and the “no read” 
problem
 “Confusopoly”
 Default setting strategies
 Debate on a more muscular 
application of Section V FTC 
Act that prohibits UMC
 Belgian Competition Act, 30 
August 2013, Article 5(3) and 
(4)
 Loi Macron discussed in French 
Parliament (structural orders)
 Net neutrality and the recent 
reclassification of broadband as 
Title II “common carrier”
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Issue
 Gap in “core” competition and consumer laws
 Practices that generate “consumer detriment” (OFT, 2004)
 But that do not infringe Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU and consumer 
laws
 Two issues
 Firms’ anticompetitive conduct that does not fall within the frontiers 
of positive competition law: Gap1
 Firms’ anti-consumer conduct that does not fall within the frontiers 
of positive consumer law: Gap 2
 Type II-error problem
 Firms are not necessarily doing anything wrong => “Problem” 
(Lowe, 2009 talking of “competition problem”)
 Though problem stems from firms’ conduct => “problem 
practices”, rather than “problem market”
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Purpose of the presentation
Method Findings
 Are the alleged gaps are 
material, or not?
 Gap 1: Lawful anticompetitive 
conduct
 Gap 2: Lawful anti-consumer 
conduct
 Check if and how Gaps 1 
and 2 are dealt with under 
competition law only
 Assess whether there is a 
Gap 3, re. procedural issues
 There is a well-known Gap 
1in theory
 Agencies often attempt to 
plug it
 Gap I cases are remedied in 
the dark, and approach chosen 
to remedy Gap I cases is 
subject to discussion
 There is a similar Gap 2
 But agencies are less active
 They could be more active
 Some instruments of 
competition law could help
 Unclear on Gap 3
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Gap I: Lawful anticompetitive 
conduct
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The legal framework (1), constraints
Article 101 Article 102
 Several independent firms
 That coordinate their
conduct
 With a restrictive 
« object » or « effect »
 A firm occupying a 
dominant position
 That unilaterally exploits 
customers or excludes 
rivals
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The legal framework (2), flexibility
Article 101 Article 102
 Most inter-firm coordinations, 
horizontal, vertical (or both)
 Low threshold for 
anticompetitive effects => 
C-32/11, Allianz Hungary, §38 
(“Whether and to what extent, in 
fact, such an effect results can only 
be of relevance for determining the 
amount of any fine and assessing 
any claim for damages”)
 Anticompetitive intent is not a 
requirement
 No appreciability requirement 
for “object” cases (Expedia)
 List of abuses not exhaustive
 Both exploitative and 
exclusionary
 No need to prove actual or 
foreseeable effects
 No need for causal link 
between abuse and dominance
 No de minimis threshold of 
abuse
 Joint dominance
 Anticompetitive intent is not a 
requirement
 Use of “imprecise legal concepts” 
is a necessary evil
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What’s in Gap 1?
Factual perspective Legal perspective
 Existing structural issue





 Unilateral invitations to collude
 Parallel anticompetitive conduct
 Anticompetitive arrangements 
within integrated firms (eg, market 
partitioning, RPM, etc.), incl. agency 
contracts
 Anticompetitive contracts with 
consumers (exclusivity)
 102 immunity
 Pricing and non pricing abuses of 
non dominant firms (number 2, 3, 4) 
// with Merger Regulation
 Incipient Article 102 TFEU conduct: 
“road to dominance” (Röller, 2009)
 Government conduct
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A reality check (factual perspective)
Problem Case
Existing structural issues E.ON, 2008 (temporary dominance)
Deutsche Bahn, 2013 (un-liberalized 
market for traction current)
Rambus, 2010 (locked-in industry, post 
standardisation)
Tacit collusion E.ON, 2008, §20
Laurent Piau, 2005,T-193/02
Guidelines on HCA, 2011
Collective exclusion E-Books case, 2013 (threats of exclusion of 
Amazon if refusal to turn to agency model 
in E-Books market)
Market manipulation EURIBOR and LIBOR cartel cases (2014, 
and ongoing); Oil and Biofuels (ongoing); 
CDS and Forex (ongoing)
Gazprom, ongoing
Google, ongoing  
A reality check (legal perspective)
Legal Instrument Problem practice Case
Article 101 TFEU Unilateral invitations to collude None
Parallel anticompetitive conduct In 101 TFEU => E-Books, 
2013 + HCG
In 102 TFEU => Laurent Piau, 
2005,T-193/02
Anticompetitive restraints within 
integrated firms (eg, market 
partitioning, RPM, etc.), including 
agency contracts
In 101 TFEU: EBooks case
In 102 TFEU => AstraZeneca, 
C-457/10 P, 2012; Sot Lelos, 
C-468/06 to C-478/06, 2008
Anticompetitive agreements with 
consumers
None
Article 102 TFEU Unilateral abuse of non dominant 
firms
E.ON, 2008 (25% of installed 
capacity)
Incipient Article 102 TFEU conduct: 
“road to dominance”
Rambus, 2010
Merger regulation 139/2004 
(external growth)
Findings (1)
 There is a clear Gap 1 in theory
 Due to the wording of Treaty, « legal » thresholds
 Coordinated conduct
 Dominance
 Agencies have often tried to plug it in practice
 Consistent with gut feeling of competition experts
 Quiz on our blog: 
http://chillingcompetition.com/2013/09/20/the-ultimate-
competition-law-quiz/
 “What is a restriction of competition?” 
 “Whatever DG COMP decides it is” 
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Findings (2)
 Gap 1 closed to some extent within EU competition law but almost 
never through “formal” infringement cases
 Settlement cases (article 9, R1/2003)
 Theory of harm unclear or framed as existing category of infringement (eg, market 
manipulation as excessive pricing)
 Or “non binding” guidance
 HCG covering practices facilitating tacit collusion and “hold up” problems
 Gap I closed outside EU competition law, by addressing competition 
issues in other EU law instruments
 Roaming regulations (existing structural issues)
 REMIT and MAD regulations (market manipulation)
 CRAs regulation (tacit collusion)
 Gap I closed through national law (DG Comp internal study)?
 Recital 8 and 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Member States can adopt 
“Stricter national competition laws … on unilateral conduct engaged in by 
undertakings” and “National legislation that prohibits or imposes sanctions 
on acts of unfair trading practice, be they unilateral or contractual”
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Findings (3)
 The choice of either approach is governed by ad hoc
unclear motivations
 Ex ante impact assessment?
 Not applicable to EU competition cases
 Applicable to EU legislation, but EU lawmakers rarely consider the 
adequacy of EU competition enforcement
 Impact assessments routinely ignore solutions adopted in the legal 
orders of the MS (Larouche, 2012)
 Review or sunset clauses?
 Not applied in EU competition cases
 No ex post assessment
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 Does EU competition law leave anti-consumer conduct 
unchecked?
 Anti-consumer conduct as consumer exploitation
 Exploitation understood as “extraction” of consumer 
surplus (Carlton and Heyer, 2008)
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Gap 2, legal framework
 Exploitation, in particular of end users, is the core of EU 
competition law (Joliet, 1970; Bellis, 2013)
 Price and non-price exploitation (quality, etc.)
 EU law covers abusive price discrimination
 But same legal thresholds as Gap 1
 Coordinated or unilateral conduct > dominance
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Gap 2, decisional practice
Exploitation Consumers
 Official disinterest for 
exploitation theories besides 
cartels (see Guidance Paper on 
Article 102 TFEU)
 Hidden application of 
exploitation theories (Hubert 
& Combet, 2011)
 Shrouding: Tetra Pak II (1992)
 Excessive prices: Rambus (2010); 
Standard&Poors (2011); IBM
(2011
 Switching costs: Thomson 
Reuters (2012)
 Hold-up: Samsung and Motorola 
(2014)
 But exploitation of business 
customers primarily, not of end 
users
 Dearth of EU cases on distribution 
agreements
 Anecdotal application in 102 TFEU 
(World Cup tickets case, 1998; C-
247/86, Alstatel v SA Novasam: 15Y 
lease contracts, with exclusivity for 
repairs; works and repairs on 
equipment unilaterally decided and 
tariffed by leaser; if modifications 
increase value by 25%, lease 
renewed for 15Y) 
 Agency reluctance to look like a 
price regulator
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Gap 2, wide open?
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 Big data and differential pricing
Conclusion
 There is a Gap 2
 Can be partly resolved as a matter of policy through (some) 
re-prioritization of Commission resources on exploitative 
cases in consumer markets
 Reluctance of agencies can be surmounted conceptually 
through equilibrium story
 Exploitation may also be a source of exclusion
 DomCo charging excessive prices in consumer market A dries up 
consumer demand on neighboring (B, C, D, etc.) and unrelated 
markets (W, X, Y, Z)
 It thus forecloses sales opportunities for other producers on a range 
of markets
 No need for specific legal basis, save for threshold issues; But 




 Lawful exploitation of 
consumers’ deficiencies by 
undertakings?
 “Failures internal to the 
consumer”, that make him 
unable to effectively choose
 Lande and Averitt, “Consumer 
Sovereignty: a Unified Theory 
OF Antitrust and Consumer 
Protection Law”,  Antitrust Law 
Journal, Spring 1997: “inside the 
head”








 Poor information 
transparency
 Divergence of incentives
 Switching costs and hold-up
Reality check (1)
Consumer deficiencies as 
exclusionary device
Unfairness offenses in B2B 
relations
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 Exploitation of consumer deficiencies 
pervades antitrust theories of 
exclusion
 The predatory pricing firm exploits 
consumers’ short termism;  the 
bundling firm exploits consumers’ 
materialism;  the price discriminating 
firm exploits consumers’ search costs
 Intel, 2009, and the “voice of doom”
 Microsoft, 2004: Pre-installation of 
WMP and IE on Windows was 
conducive to leveraging because of 
‘end-users’ inertia’
 Microsoft, 2009: Commission relied on 
empirical analyses to confirm findings 
of exclusion.  Consumer survey 
showed that a majority of users (51 
per cent) had not downloaded 
alternative browsers
 Rambus: deceitful conduct
 Samsung and Motorola: 
“false” FRAND 
commitment that fools 
market participants?
 AstraZeneca: provision of 


















Gap I Gap II
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 Legal threshold problem
 Some Gap 1 cases are 
plugged (i) informally within 
competition law, though with 
some limits; (ii) indirectly 
outside competition law; or 
(iii) in national law
 Diversity of approaches is 
arresting
 And indirect approaches 
which yield accountability 
issue
 Legal threshold problem
 + policy problem, reluctance to 
look-like price regulator in 
exploitation cases
 Few cases relating to end-users
 Gap may increase with new 
economy, (eg opportunities
afforded by big data)?
 For consumer deficiencies, 
same as Gap 1, remedied in the 
dark
 Unclear approach, specific
instrument as agency enabler?
The debate
 In the US, debate on Section V of the FTC act, on “Unfair 
Methods of Competition”
 Kovacic & Winerman: “Frontier” cases or cases beyond the reach of 
conventional antitrust law can be dealt with under UMC, but must 
be “competition-based”, or Sherman-related
 Commissioner Ohlhausen: need a “chart”; economic regulation of 
business conduct, not social or industrial regulation; conduct w/o 
efficiencies or w efficiencies but disproportionately anticompetitive
 Commissioner Wright: conduct w/o efficiencies; enforcement to be 
driven by empiricism
 Existing approaches at national level
 Article 5(3) and (4), Belgian Competition Act of 2013
 UK market investigations
 France: “compétence d’avis” and “injonction structurelle”
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Article 5(3) and (4), Belgian Competition Act
 Price monitoring observatory => to draft report if 
“problem in relation to prices or margins; abnormal price 
change; or structural market problem”
 On its own motion or seized by Minister
 Report sent to the Belgian Competition Agency
 BCA can decide to adopt interim measures for 6 months, 
including price freezes
 After 6 months, the Minister – and the Government – can 
decide whether more permanent changes are needed








 Dominant position + Abnormal margins or prices
 Deterrence








Gap 3 at EU level?
 No specific instrument in positive EU law
 But possibility to use existing tools (Bellis, 2013)
 Set out ex ante guidelines in “frontier” cases: guidelines through 
hard and soft law: Article 10 decisions, Recital 38 guidance 
letters,  Communication and Notices, sector inquiries reports
 Apply ex post cease an desist decisions without fines in 
“frontier” cases
 Article 7 and 8 decisions
 Article 9 decisions are not a surrogate (“summary investigation and 





 “Frontier” cases are already 
covered under Article 9 (Bellis, 
2013), so they shall be open for 
resolution under Article 7 or 8 
TFEU (unless one believes they 
are unlawful cases)
 “Effectiveness” theory is 
influential in EU competition 
policy
 In other areas of EU law, 
flexibility clause of Article 
352§1 TFEU
 Bellis seems to have in mind novel 
cases, ie cases without clear 
precedent. Not necessarily frontier 
cases
 Under proposed framework, 
Commission must still prove an 
infringement of Article 101 and/or 
102 TFEU
 Scope of 101 and 102 can only be 
expanded through EU legislation, see 
EUMR 1989
 And unlikely, because flexibility 
clauses cannot rewrite Treaty law!!!
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Ad hoc instrument, design issues
 Debate in the US (and in Belgium)
 “Incipiency” theory?
 “Neighboring” issues? 
 Many practices that harm related objectives can be framed in competition 
terms
 Market integrity: insider trading as abuse of informational dominance, that 
dissuades operators to participate to markets
 Industrial policy: social dumping by non domestic firm, as abuse of dominance 
through the exploitation of unfair cost advantages
 Tax efficiency: taxation corrects the effects of supra-competitive pricing. Tax 
fraud by dominant firms is a means to evade this corrective instrument
 Consumer protection: contracts with consumers, as anticompetitive 
agreements
 “Spirit” theory? 
 Conduct that undermines the goals of the competition rules, but that falls 
below the enforcement threshold






 Ad hoc instrument with streamlined procedure marks 
improvements in terms of legitimacy and accountability
 But substantive scope remains key issue
 Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, FTC, Remarks before the Annual 
Meeting of the Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation of the 
Association of American Law Schools, Atlanta, Ga. (Dec. 27, 1977): 
“No responsive competition policy can neglect the social and 
environmental harms produced as by‐products of the marketplace: 
resource depletion, energy waste, environmental contamination, worker 
alienation, the psychological and social consequences of 
producer‐stimulated demands”
 “The FTC as National Nanny”,  WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22.
 Not too remote!!!
 Need to devote time to goals of EU competition law
